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The genesis of the present method of appointing s. 96 judges was the 1985 Canadian 
Bar Association Committee on the Appointment of Judges in Canada, of which I was 
chairman, which was approved by the council of the CBA in 1986.1 It was the first 
comprehensive study of the subject.
The committee first identified, for its guidance, the following qualities required 
of those considered for judicial appointments:
• Personal competence and overall merit.
• High moral character.
• Human qualities: sympathy, generosity, charity, patience.
• Experience in the law.
• Intellectual ability and good judgment.
• Good health and good work habits.
• Bilingualism, if required by the nature of the post.
The CBA committee interviewed all present and former Ministers of Justice, 
provincial Attorneys General, Chief Justices, and many leaders of the profession, 
among others, and considered the appointment practices in other countries. It 
obtained a reasonably complete cross-section of opinion on how judges should be 
appointed. The objective was to identify weaknesses in the system used at the time, 
and several recommendations for improvement were made.
In its deliberations, the CBA committee considered the practice in 30 American 
state courts of electing judges. This idea was rejected out of hand at the first meeting 
of the committee. Many well-qualified lawyers would shun this process because of a 
distaste for campaigning, and there is a precariousness in tenure. The electoral 
process compromises the necessary independence of judges. There was a case in
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Texas where one of the lawyers made a substantial contribution to the election 
campaign of a judge before whom the lawyer was appearing; the lawyer won the 
case. Although this occurred after the committee reported, the experience confirmed 
that the committee made the correct decision.
The CBA committee also considered the American practice where, at the 
confirmation stage, nominees are sometimes subjected to intensive grilling by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee concerning their views on current social and political 
questions, and possible conflicts of interest. Public senatorial prying into a 
candidate’s private affairs can sometimes amount to a virtual inquisition. Moreover, 
there is no assurance that a candidate, once appointed, will follow the comments and 
opinions expressed at the hearing. This practice reduces the number of qualified 
lawyers because many are not willing to expose themselves to that type of 
questioning.
The CBA committee made inquiries to determine the extent to which political 
appointments had entered into the system. It was found that in some provinces 
political affiliation was a minor factor, in some it was a dominant factor, and in 
others it was in between. The CBA committee was advised by an American 
colleague, in a state where advisory committees existed, that the advisory committee 
system did not eliminate political considerations, but ensured that political 
appointees were qualified. It should be noted that the fact that a candidate is a 
supporter of the party in power is not necessarily bad, provided the person appointed 
is qualified. In one case where a clearly political appointment was made, the Chief 
Justice said that appointee was one of his best judges.
The CBA committee recommended that the final decision on the appointment 
of judges must remain with the government, that there should be meaningful 
consultation between the federal appointing authority and the provincial Attorneys 
General, as well as Chief Justices and bar organizations. The practice of 
appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada to be representative of the regions and 
legal systems of Canada should be continued. There should be no role for Parliament 
in the selection or appointment of federal judges. It is considered neither necessary or 
desirable for the legislative branch of government to be involved.
The most important recommendation of the CBA committee was the 
establishment of advisory committees in each province and territory to advise the 
Minister of Justice, who would be expected to make appointments from names 
recommended by the committees. The committees would consider names suggested 
by the minister and other sources, and would also seek out names of candidates 
themselves. The objective was to obtain suggestions for candidates from a wide 
variety of sources. Committees would be limited to recommending three persons 
qualified to fill each position.
The members of advisory committees for provincial and territorial judges 
should be the Chief Justice of the province (or a nominee), one person appointed by 
the federal Minister of Justice, one by the Attorney General of the province or 
territory, two lawyers—one appointed by the governing body of the legal profession
in the province or territory and one by the Canadian Bar Association branch therein, 
and two laypersons appointed by a majority vote of the other members of the 
committee. In the case of appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, the relevant 
advisory committee(s) would be the one for the province or those of the provinces in 
the region from which the appointment is to be made. A separate committee was 
recommended for appointments to the Federal Court of Canada.
Each member of the advisory committee would consult his/her own group to 
get a cross-section of opinion as to a candidate’s qualifications; the judge would 
consult with other judges, the lawyers would consult with other lawyers, and the 
laypersons would consult with other laypersons—particularly their acquaintances or 
others in their profession, business, or social groups. All such consultations would be 
confidential.
For appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, the relevant advisory 
committee(s) would be the one for the province, or those of the provinces in the 
region, from which the appointment is to be made.
A separate committee was recommended for the Federal Court of Canada. This 
committee was similar to the one for the provinces, except that the judicial member 
would be the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Canada (or a nominee); one of two 
lawyers was to be appointed by the Federation of Law Societies, the other by the 
CBA; and there were three others, at least two of whom were laypeople.
The federal government adopted the advisory committee process recommended 
by the CBA committee (although they didn’t acknowledge that it originated from the 
CBA, taking all the credit themselves) with some notable flaws:
• Elevations to the post of Chief Justice and elevations from the provincial 
court to a superior court are not assessed by the committees. (The then 
Minister of Justice refused to reconsider, saying that it was the 
responsibility of the minister to determine elevations, not lawyers; my reply 
was to suggest that it would be better to have input from a cross-section of 
the public rather than leave it to one person. My argument fell on deaf ears.)
• The lay people on the committees are appointed by the Minister of Justice, 
not elected by other members of the committees.
• The recommendation regarding appointments to the Supreme Court of 
Canada was not followed.
• The committees are required to submit a report on all of the persons filing 
applications, not just three as recommended by the committee.
There were four other changes from those recommended by the CBA 
committee:
• The committees are expected to report on all applicants in two categories: 
recommended or unable to recommend. (At one time there was a third 
category: highly recommended.)
• The proposal of a separate committee for the Federal Court of Canada was 
not adopted, but the prospective appointees are considered by the advisory 
committee of that person’s province or territory.
• Applications remain on file for two years.
• Because of their larger populations, Ontario now has three regionally based 
committees and Québec has two. The other provinces/territories have only 
one.
Recently, some important changes have been made to the advisory committee 
system:
• A new process for the screening of appointment of judges to the Supreme 
Court of Canada, as described below.
• A nominee of the law enforcement community has been added to the 
committee.
• The judicial appointee to the committees becomes chair and is not entitled 
to vote, except to break a tie.
An important addition made by the government, not covered by the CBA 
committee’s recommendations, was the requirement that a person interested in a 
judicial appointment file an application form with the Commissioner for Federal 
Judicial Affairs of the Department of Justice, stating the qualifications which that 
person believes qualifies him/her for a judicial appointment. That officer passes the 
application along to the applicable advisory committee. There is nothing wrong with 
requiring an application, and it has its advantages. It also has disadvantages when 
there are not a sufficient number of applicants where a linguistic or other balance in 
the court is required. In one instance in New Brunswick, there was an insufficient 
number of francophone applicants, and they had to be obtained in order to maintain 
the linguistic balance of the court. The members of the committee, therefore, had to 
contact francophone lawyers and encourage them to apply for a judicial appointment. 
It was moderately successful. The original concept of the CBA committee to actively 
seek out candidates itself was not followed when the system of applications was 
inaugurated.
The new process for the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court of Canada 
recently instituted by the government does not follow the recommendations of the 
CBA committee. There are two stages to the new process. The first is a committee 
consisting of MPs from all four parties, a judge, two lawyers, and two laypeople, 
who are to advise the Minister on the best of five to eight candidates selected by the
Minister of Justice. The committee can add a name, but only if the minister agrees. In 
the second stage, one of those recommended is selected by the minister to appear 
before a committee of Parliament. When the candidate appears before that 
committee, the chairperson is required to disallow politically inspired questions, and 
those attempting to determine how the applicant would decide questions coming 
before the court. Based on only one instance, this practice has avoided an American- 
style questioning of judicial applicants, but the system has the potential to get out of 
hand and become more like the American experience.
Under the new process, the government of the day totally controls the process 
of identifying candidates that would get serious consideration.
I believe that questioning by a parliamentary committee is not advisable and 
that the establishment of a Supreme Court of Canada advisory committee(s), as 
recommended by the CBA committee, would be adequate. Certainly, the identity of 
members of the advisory committees, and also the committees in the provinces and 
territories, should be made public so that the public is aware of who is advising the 
Minister of Justice. There are potential problems if the use of similar legislative 
committees is adopted by the provinces and territories; there is a greater likelihood 
that the system will get out of control.
I also believe it is a misconceived notion to include a nominee of the law 
enforcement community (presumably the police force) on the advisory committees. 
All members of advisory committees must have an open mind as to the type of 
person to be appointed to the bench. This means that persons representing a special 
interest should not be members of the committees. Members of the law enforcement 
community represent a special interest—obtaining convictions. This sort of 
representation has no place on the advisory committees.
Depriving the judicial members of the committees (who act as chairs) of a vote 
is a step in the wrong direction. The Minister of Justice appoints the nominee of the 
law enforcement community and three members of the committee, thus giving the 
minister’s appointees a majority with the power to determine who is recommended 
for the bench—if they all vote together. If the minister is careful to appoint people 
who are truly independent and will not simply follow the minister’s wishes, the 
committee may function properly. However, the fact that the minister’s appointees 
have a majority changes the dynamics of the committees and could cause a 
difference in the nature of the discussions; the other members might feel intimidated 
knowing that their opinions could be ignored. This could become a flaw in the new 
system.
The office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs has recently issued 
extensive material on the process for federal judicial appointments, including a 
description of the process, considerations which apply to an application for 
appointment, guidelines for advisory committee members, a code of ethics for 
advisory committee members, and a report on the activities of judicial advisory 
committees in 2004 to 2006, as well as a list of the members of all judicial
appointment advisory committees.2 The report resulted in the following: from 1 
November 2004 to 31 October 2005, there were 1,043 applications received; 138 
were highly recommended, 459 were recommended, and 620 were unable to 
recommend. Only 46 superior court judges were appointed. Obviously, there is only 
a slim chance that a nominee will be appointed. (These numbers will not add up 
because of outstanding applications before and after the period surveyed.)
There can be no doubt that the present system of judicial appointments has 
improved the quality of those appointed to s. 96 courts.
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